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NOTES 
PLAIN READING, SUBTLE MEANING:  
RETHINKING THE IOIA AND THE IMMUNITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
George B. Adams III* 
 
Immunity is freedom from liability, and as such, it can quite literally 
provide a “get out of jail free” card.  In the United States, international 
organizations face uncertainty about the scope of their immunity, which is 
provided by the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA).  The 
D.C. Circuit has found that international organizations enjoy absolute 
immunity under the IOIA.  Conversely, the Third Circuit recently held that 
international organizations are only entitled to restrictive immunity, which 
limits immunity to claims involving an organization’s public acts and does 
not exempt them from suits based on their commercial or private conduct. 
This Note contends that a plain reading of the IOIA, combined with a full 
understanding of the history and legislative purpose behind the immunity of 
international organizations, presents a third interpretation.  It concludes 
that the IOIA requires judicial deference to immunity determinations by the 
executive branch, which provides the flexibility necessary to allow 
international organizations to operate without undue interference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2011, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former head of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), was arrested for allegedly sexually 
assaulting a housekeeper in his suite at the Sofitel Hotel in Manhattan.1  
Strauss-Kahn decided not to claim immunity during the criminal 
proceedings, explaining that “he wanted to clear his name.”2  However, 
when the housekeeper later filed a civil suit, his lawyers argued to the court 
that his former status as the head of an international organization protected 
him from lawsuits, including those based upon “acts done in the executive’s 
personal capacity.”3  The court ultimately rejected the immunity claim 
because Strauss-Kahn had resigned from his post at the IMF before the suit 
was filed, and therefore any immunity that he might have enjoyed had 
expired.4  The decision thus left open the question of whether Strauss-Kahn 
would have enjoyed immunity had he not resigned.  This larger question—
whether international organizations and their employees enjoy absolute or 
restrictive immunity under U.S. law—is the subject of a current split among 
federal courts.5 
Under the so-called “restrictive” theory of immunity, government entities 
enjoy full protection for their public acts, but surrender their privilege when 
acting as private parties.6  Congress formally adopted the theory of 
restrictive immunity with respect to foreign states when it passed the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19767 (FSIA).  However, while the 
FSIA clearly limited the immunity owed to foreign states, it does not speak 
to the immunity of international organizations.8  Although international 
organizations share some functional similarities to foreign states, they are 
granted immunity under a separate, older statute—the International 
Organizations Immunities Act of 19459 (IOIA)–which, by its text, affords 
international organizations “the same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign 
 
 1. See Russ Buettner, Bronx Judge Rejects Stauss-Kahn’s Claim of Diplomatic 
Immunity in Sexual Assault Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at A23. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Diallo v. Strauss-Kahn, No. 307065/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 2012), available 
at http://www.nycourts.gov/press/DSK-30706511.pdf. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 8. See infra Part I.D. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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governments.”10  However, a circuit split has developed concerning the 
immunity referenced by the IOIA, and whether it adopts revisions to U.S. 
law governing foreign sovereign immunity, most importantly the FSIA.11 
Part I of this Note examines the legislative history and policy interests 
behind both statutes.  Part II analyzes the divergent approaches taken by the 
D.C. and Third Circuits regarding the relevance of post-IOIA foreign state 
immunity doctrine to the immunity of international organizations in U.S. 
courts.  Finally, Part II suggests that both circuits formed their conclusions 
based on incomplete historical understandings of sovereign immunity at the 
time the IOIA was passed.  Clarifying that history gives the IOIA’s 
reference to sovereign immunity a new meaning—one that conforms to a 
plain reading of the statute as a whole and also follows the intent expressed 
in the legislative history.  This new reading, which advocates judicial 
deference to immunity determinations by the executive branch, would allow 
for the articulation of a clear standard of immunity for international 
organizations. 
I.  SAME AS WHAT?  A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Part I explores the development of foreign sovereign immunity and its 
relation to the IOIA.  Part I.A traces the advancement of absolute sovereign 
immunity in U.S. courts up through the early twentieth century and then 
highlights the abandonment of that doctrine in favor of judicial deference to 
executive policy starting in the late 1930s.  Part I.B describes the sudden 
prominence of international organizations in the aftermath of World War II, 
the United States’s leading role in forming and empowering these 
organizations, and the interplay between the United States’s new global 
prominence and the creation of the IOIA.  Part I.C explains the State 
Department’s decision to adopt the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign 
immunity, the problems caused by State Department determination of 
sovereign immunity, and Congress’s intention to relieve these issues by 
passing the FSIA.  Finally, Part I.D traces the initial post-FSIA treatments 
of the IOIA and the development of the corresponding benefit test. 
A.  The Development of Sovereign Immunity in the United States, 
1812 to 1945 
In Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank,12 decided in 1998, the 
D.C. Circuit found that Congress’s intention when it passed the IOIA was 
to grant to international organizations the same immunity as foreign 
sovereigns “as it existed in 1945—when immunity of foreign sovereigns 
 
 10. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006); infra 
Part I.B.3. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. 156 F.3d 1335, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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was absolute.”13  However, while sovereigns did enjoy absolute immunity 
in the United States for a time, that time had arguably passed when the 
IOIA was enacted in December 1945.14  The following discussion describes 
the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity law in U.S. courts, starting 
with the development of an absolute immunity standard from 1812 through 
the early 1930s.  It then examines the expansion of executive authority over 
all matters of foreign policy in the late 1930s, and the corresponding shift 
away from judicial determination and absolute foreign sovereign immunity. 
1.  Recognition of Foreign Sovereign Immunity by the U.S. Supreme Court:  
From The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon to 
Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro 
The immunity of a foreign state sued in the national courts of the United 
State has “long and uncritically” been understood as a sub-constitutional 
question and, therefore, fully subject to congressional determination and 
discretion.15  However, for much of U.S. history, foreign sovereign 
immunity was not regulated by congressional statute; rather, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined immunity questions.16  In other words, up to the 
1930s, foreign sovereign immunity was decided as a matter of federal 
common law, wherein the Court observed a strict absolute immunity 
standard for foreign states.17  Consequently, if a defendant qualified as a 
foreign sovereign in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. 
courts consistently found that it had immunity for all of its acts, including 
those that were commercial in nature.18 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon19 is generally regarded as the 
landmark decision on sovereign immunity in the United States.20  The case 
involved a French warship that had taken shelter in the port of Philadelphia 
during a storm.21  The ship was alleged to be a converted U.S. 
merchantman, and its purported American owners brought an in rem 
 
 13. See id. at 1341. 
 14. See Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts:  Reconsidering the 
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 502 (2008). 
 15. See Thomas H. Lee, The World Balance of Power and the Evolution of U.S. 
Foreign-States Law 33 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review).  Professor Lee argues that this question is open to criticism from a historical 
perspective, as evidence suggests that some framers believed that the Constitution required 
consent for suits against foreign states. See id. at 33–34. 
 16. See id. at 32. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 572 (2003) (describing how the foreign sovereign immunity recognized by 
the Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange was gradually extended to all government 
property and eventually to any suit against a foreign nation). 
 19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
 20. See VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN 
U.S. COURTS 526 (2003); see also Steven R. Swanson, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445, 448 (1999). 
 21. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 117; see also Lee, supra note 15, at 35. 
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admiralty action to reclaim it.22  In deciding The Schooner Exchange, Chief 
Justice Marshall found that a French ship of war was not subject to the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts due to the international convention of “perfect 
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns.”23  However, Chief 
Justice Marshall made clear that the court was following custom, not 
binding law:  foreign sovereign states were not categorically immune from 
U.S. jurisdiction; rather, Congress could authorize courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over any property within its territory.24  Instead, foreign 
sovereign immunity was a matter of mutual expectation between sovereign 
states that was necessary for nations to freely interact.25  According to Chief 
Justice Marshall, sovereigns were bound “not to degrade the dignity of 
[their] nation,” and consequently, would never expose their sovereign rights 
to the jurisdiction of another by entering a foreign territory without an 
assurance that “the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign 
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and 
will be extended to him.”26 
By its own terms, The Schooner Exchange applied only to the public 
property of a foreign sovereign destined for public use.27  In fact, Chief 
Justice Marshall considered the distinction between the public and private 
actions of a foreign sovereign and suggested that only the former should be 
accorded immunity.28  Over time, however, the public purpose of sovereign 
property received an expansive interpretation, extending immunity first to 
foreign ships that were not warships, then to foreign government property, 
 
 22. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 116–17; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, 
at 526; Lee, supra note 15, at 35. 
 23. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137; see also Swanson supra note 20, at 448. 
 24. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137, 146 (“Without doubt, the sovereign of 
the place is capable of destroying this implication.  He may claim and exercise jurisdiction 
either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals.  But until 
such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be 
considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a 
breach of faith to exercise.”); see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 527; Lee, supra 
note 15, at 36.  Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion is often cited as the basis for the 
conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. courts is fully subject to congressional 
control. See Lee, supra note 15, at 36. 
 25. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 527. 
 26. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, 
at 527. 
 27. See Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United States 
Courts:  Absolute or Restrictive? 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 693 (1991). 
 28. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 145 (“[T]here is a manifest distinction 
between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and that military 
force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and the independence 
of a nation.  A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be 
considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as 
so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual; but this he 
cannot be presumed to do with respect to any portion of that armed force, which upholds his 
crown, and the nation he is entrusted to govern.”); see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 
20, at 527. 
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and finally to any suit against a foreign nation.29  Eventually The Schooner 
Exchange came to be regarded as granting absolute immunity to foreign 
sovereigns in almost any endeavor.30 
The extent of this expanded immunity was demonstrated in 1926 when 
the U.S. Supreme Court heard Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro.31  In 
Pesaro, the Court considered whether sovereign immunity applied to the 
commercial actions of a foreign government.32  The Court’s decision in 
Pesaro included two key conclusions:  First, the Court held that sovereign 
immunity was absolute, finding that The Schooner Exchange’s rationale for 
the immunity of foreign sovereigns applied equally to a state’s public acts 
and commercial acts.33  Second, the Court made clear that the judiciary, not 
the executive, would decide the scope of sovereign immunity.34  In the 
district court, the State Department had recommended that customary 
foreign sovereign immunity was not appropriate when foreign states 
engaged in commercial activities;35 however, on appeal the Supreme Court 
declined to address that recommendation, thereby implicitly suggesting that 
the executive branch’s view ought not to influence the Court’s analysis in 
any way.36  As a result, following Pesaro, foreign sovereigns could expect 
to enjoy absolute immunity in the United States, as the Supreme Court 
indicated that the scope of foreign sovereign immunity would be treated as 
a judicial inquiry, and precedent dictated that this immunity was absolute.37 
2.  Judicial Deference to the Executive Branch:  Ex parte Republic of Peru 
and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman 
The Great Depression and the New Deal era saw momentous changes in 
the relationship between the executive branch and the U.S. Supreme 
Court.38  During this time, challenges to judicial formalism under the so-
called “New Deal Court” gradually undermined the acceptance of the 
deductive, common-law-based rulemaking that constituted the Court’s 
approach in decisions like Pesaro.39  Instead, under the leadership of Chief 
Justice Hughes, the Court increasingly applied a “realist” approach that was 
 
 29. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 693–94; BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, 
at 572. 
 30. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing The 
Schooner Exchange for the proposition that “[f]or more than a century and a half, the United 
States generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this 
country”). 
 31. 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926). 
 32. See id.; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 503–04. 
 33. See Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 503–04. 
 34. Herz, supra note 14, at 504. 
 35. See The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); see also Herz, supra note 14, 
at 504. 
 36. See Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574; Herz, supra note 14, at 504. 
 37. See Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574; Herz, supra note 14, at 503–04. 
 38. See Herz, supra note 14, at 504–05. 
 39. See id. at 504. 
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more politically conscious and deferential to the elected branches.40  In 
particular, this approach was defined by a newfound respect for the 
executive branch in matters of foreign policy.41  In a series of cases 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Court consolidated the authority of the 
President to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs.42 
That authority included the ability to determine sovereign immunity.  
Between 1938 and 1945, the Court gradually abandoned Pesaro’s position 
that sovereign immunity was a judicial question in favor of a new approach 
in which the foreign policy considerations of the State Department were 
controlling.43  Under this new approach, the determinations of the executive 
branch with regard to foreign sovereign immunity were binding on courts, 
regardless of what international custom might say.44  This change in policy 
had important implications because, in the aftermath of the worldwide 
Great Depression, many governments were no longer hesitant to enter the 
commercial arena.45  Consequently, the question of whether a sovereign, 
acting in a purely commercial manner, should enjoy immunity took on 
increasing importance.46 
By the end of 1945, two cases made clear that it was State Department 
policy, and not the courts, that determined sovereign immunity.  Those 
cases also made it clear that sovereign immunity was no longer absolute.  In 
Ex parte Republic of Peru,47 the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed 
the executive branch’s role in immunity decisions and, in a complete 
reversal of earlier opinions, concluded that the Court would follow the State 
Department’s recommendation rather than risk embarrassment to U.S. 
foreign relations.48   
Ex parte Peru involved a claim against a vessel owned and operated by 
Peru, 49 who had obtained a letter from the State Department declaring that 
the United States “recognizes and allows the claim of immunity.”50  The 
Court held that the State Department’s determination of immunity was 
conclusive and that the ship was therefore immune from seizure:  “[T]he 
judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a 
challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that 
courts are required to accept and follow the executive determination that the 
vessel is immune.”51 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 505; see also BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 573. 
 42. See Herz, supra note 14, at 505. 
 43. See id. at 504. 
 44. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 573; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, 
supra note 20, at 529. 
 45. See Herz, supra note 14, at 505. 
 46. See id. 
 47. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
 48. See id. at 588; Oparil, supra note 27, at 694; Swanson, supra note 20, at 449. 
 49. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 580. 
 50. See id. at 581; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529. 
 51. Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529. 
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In the second case, Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,52 the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied the same rule of absolute deference to the executive branch as 
it did in Ex parte Peru, but this time it denied immunity.53  Hoffman 
involved a claim for damages made against a merchant vessel owned by 
Mexico, but operated by a private company.54  In response to Mexico’s 
request for a statement of immunity, the State Department recognized 
Mexico’s ownership of the vessel, but did not recommend that immunity be 
granted.55  Instead, the State Department instructed the Court to refer to 
earlier statements and decisions relating to similar issues.56  Accordingly, in 
light of prior determinations and in the absence of a new immunity 
recommendation by the executive branch, the Supreme Court held that it 
would be inappropriate to grant immunity to the vessel:  “[I]t is therefore 
not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to 
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has 
not seen fit to recognize.”57 
As a result of Ex parte Peru and Hoffman, by early 1945 U.S. foreign 
sovereign immunity law had clearly departed from an absolute immunity 
standard.58  Instead, courts deferred to the State Department’s foreign 
sovereign immunity determinations when deciding whether immunity was 
appropriate in a particular suit.59  If no specific recommendation was made, 
courts restricted themselves to the level of immunity recommended by 
previous State Department determinations.60 
B.  The Rise of International Organizations and the Creation of the 
International Organizations Immunities Act 
The end of World War II witnessed a renewed, and more practical, 
emphasis on the importance of international governmental organizations—
organizations consisting primarily or entirely of sovereign member states 
and that operate across national borders.61  This focus coincided with the 
 
 52. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
 53. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35; NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529–30. 
 54. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 31. 
 55. See id. at 36–37. 
 56. See id.; see also Swanson supra note 20, at 449–50. 
 57. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529–30. 
 58. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35–36 (“It is therefore not for the courts to deny an 
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new 
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. . . .  [R]ecognition by the courts 
of an immunity upon principles which the political department of government has not 
sanctioned may be equally embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our national 
interests and their recognition by other nations.”); Herz, supra note 14, at 510. 
 59. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 529; see also Herz, supra note 14, at 508–
10. 
 60. See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36–38; see also NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 530. 
 61. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488; see, e.g., International Organizations Immunities 
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006) (defining an international organization as “a public international 
organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the 
authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation 
for such participation, and which shall have been designated by the President through 
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rise of the United States as a global power.62  The result was an 
understanding that the United States would play an essential role in these 
new organizations.63  The following sections discuss this dynamic and 
explain how it led to the adoption of the IOIA. 
1.  The Growth of International Organizations in the Aftermath of 
World War II 
As World War II drew to a close, the Allied Powers recognized a need 
for international cooperation to rebuild the devastated global economy and 
guard against another outbreak of violence.64  While the League of Nations 
had failed to prevent the war, that failure had not produced a sense of 
futility about the effectiveness of international organizations.65  Rather, the 
lesson drawn was that international organizations had to be given teeth, as 
the problem with earlier organizations was that they were too idealistic and 
lacked institutional heft.66  The Allies’ response was to create a multitude of 
international organizations whose purposes would be to deter aggression, 
facilitate the resolution of conflicts, provide financing for reconstruction, 
and stabilize global currencies and trade.67  Some of these organizations, 
like the United Nations (U.N.), the IMF, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the Organization of 
American States (OAS) have become household names, while others have 
received scant media attention.68  But well known or not, these 
organizations have come to assume “massive importance” in international 
politics and the global economy.69 
A key factor in the post-World War II redevelopment of international 
organizations was the widespread acceptance of the “functional necessity” 
test in international theory and practice.70  Under this test, international 
organizations possess the immunities that are “necessary for the fulfillment 
of [their] purposes” and for their independence from member states.71  
Independence is generally understood as “the authority to act with a degree 
of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres.”72  The 
functional necessity test was viewed as a means of recognizing the interests 
 
appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and 
immunities provided in this subchapter”). 
 62. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488; see also INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO 
PLOWSHARES 61 (4th ed. 1984). 
 63. See CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 61. 
 64. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488. 
 65. See CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 57. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 57–58. 
 68. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 689. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1167, 1181 (1982) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunities]. 
 71. See id. (internal citations omitted). 
 72. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 9 (1998). 
2012] PLAIN READING, SUBTLE MEANING 251 
of member states—particularly the more powerful ones that were unlikely 
to join an organization they could not influence—without leaving an 
organization so exposed that it would be unable to achieve the ends for 
which it was formed.73 
Initially, concern for the independence of these new organizations that 
were established in the 1940s and 1950s led to a consensus that 
international organizations required complete jurisdictional immunity.74  
However, while the strength and durability of these organizations has since 
been proven over time, the basic purpose for granting immunity to 
international organizations remains the same:  “to secure for them both 
legal and practical independence, so that these international organizations 
should be able to fulfill their task.”75  This goal is reflected in the U.N. 
Charter, adopted in June 1945, which provides:  “The Organization shall 
enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its 
purposes.”76  Similar provisions are included in the charters or basic 
instruments of most other international organizations.77 
2.  U.S. Supremacy After World War II and Its Leadership in the 
Formation of International Organizations 
Among the nations working to form a new system of international 
organizations in the aftermath of World War II, the United States was 
generally regarded as the indispensible participant.78  The primacy of the 
United States in this undertaking was due to at least two factors:  The first 
was the nation’s “unequaled” military and economic power.79  The second 
was the global prestige of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose efforts to 
build a lasting peace brought him recognition as “the spiritual father of the 
United Nations.”80  Because of the United States’s prominence, it was 
considered a “practical certainty” that many of these organizations would be 
located, or at least conduct substantial activity, within its borders.81 
 
 73. See id. at 16. 
 74. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1181. 
 75. JOSEF L. KUNZ, Privileges and Immunities International Organizations, in THE 
CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS:  ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 509, 522–23 (1968). 
 76. U.N. Charter art. 104; see THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 506 (2d 
ed. 1987).  Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, which could extend to any activity that a 
foreign nation chooses to engage in, the functional immunity of international organizations 
only applies to those limited activities that the organization was formed to perform. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 8, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; Articles of Agreement of the International Development 
Association art. 8, Sept. 24, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249; see also, FRANCK & 
GLENNON, supra note 76, at 506. 
 78. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488; see also CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 61. 
 79. See CLAUDE, supra note 62, at 61. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Herz, supra note 14, at 488.  For example, in 1945 Congress invited the U.N. to 
establish its permanent base in the United States, and soon thereafter the organization settled 
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However, locating international organizations within the United States 
left them more vulnerable to actions and pressures by the U.S. government 
than by other nations.82  As a result, in order to host these organizations the 
United States had to assure the international community that suitable 
conditions were in place to protect their legal and practical independence.83 
3.  The Creation and Enactment of the International 
Organizations Immunities Act 
The IOIA was enacted in 1945 to provide international organizations 
with the necessary immunity under U.S. law to enable them to fulfill their 
proper functions when operating in the United States.84  The key provision 
of the IOIA, section 2, specifies: 
International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever 
located, and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from 
suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly 
waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms 
of any contract.85 
Before the IOIA was enacted, U.S. law made no provision for the 
immunity of either international organizations or their personnel.86  
However, the United States did generally recognize international 
organizations as having legal capacity, and as a result, those organizations 
were left vulnerable to suits on the same basis as private parties.87 
The driving force behind the IOIA was a report submitted by the 
Secretary of State to the President after the San Francisco Conference on 
the U.N. Charter.88  The report concluded that Article 105 of the U.N. 
Charter required the United States to enact appropriate immunity legislation 
to ensure the organization’s independence.89  Due to the high probability 
that the U.N. would locate within the United States, or at the very least, 
carry out substantial activities there, it became “essential to adopt this . . . 
 
into its current headquarters in New York City. See BOB REINALDA, ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 286 (2009).  
 82. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1185. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2 (1945); S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2 (1945). 
 85. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006). 
 86. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2; see also Jurisdictional 
Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168. 
 87. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168. 
 88. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1169. 
 89. See id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1–3 (“1. The Organization shall enjoy in 
the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
fulfillment of its purposes.  2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and 
officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the 
Organization.  3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to 
determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may 
propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.”). 
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legislation promptly.”90  Of particular concern was ensuring that the 
extension of suitable privileges and immunities to international 
organizations like the U.N. did not “embarrass” the United States in its 
foreign relations.91  Consequently, the State Department drafted and 
sponsored a bill granting judicial immunity to international organizations 
and presented it to Congress for further action.92 
According to congressional reports discussing the bill, the basic purpose 
of the IOIA was to “confer upon international organizations . . . privileges 
and immunities of a governmental nature.”93  Those privileges were to be 
“similar to those granted by the United States to foreign governments and 
their officials,”94 but not identical, as the reasons behind granting immunity 
to international organizations differed from those for recognizing sovereign 
immunity.95  While sovereign immunity reflected the concerns of 
international custom and national dignity,96 the immunity of international 
organizations reflected America’s foreign policy decision to surrender some 
of its sovereign jurisdiction in exchange for membership in the growing 
body of international organizations.97  The congressional reports provide a 
justification for why the United States would willingly surrender 
jurisdiction, explaining that the IOIA reflected the “self-interest” of the 
United States by not only protecting the official actions of international 
organizations in the United States, but also “strengthen[ing] the position” of 
other organizations of which the United States was a member, but which 
were located or acting in other countries.98 
Furthermore, in considering the IOIA, Congress relied on an assertion 
from the State Department that the immunity granted to international 
organizations and their officials would be “somewhat more limited than 
those which are extended by the United States to foreign governments.”99  
For example, the immunity of officers and officials of international 
organizations would be limited to acts performed in their official capacity, 
whereas the diplomatic officers of foreign nations enjoyed full immunity 
from legal process.100 
Moreover, the immunities provided for by the IOIA could easily be 
limited by Presidential action.101  In recommending the bill’s passage, the 
House Committee on Ways and Means found that the “interests of the 
 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1169. 
 93. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 1; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 1 (1945). 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6; see also S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 1. 
 95. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168. 
 96. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 97. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2; see also Jurisdictional 
Immunities, supra note 70, at 1168. 
 98. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 2; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2. 
 99. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6; S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 3. 
 100. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6. 
 101. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006). 
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United States are adequately protected . . . [by] the broad powers granted to 
the President.”102  Section 1 of the IOIA provides that: 
The President [is] authorized, in the light of the functions performed by 
any such international organization, by appropriate Executive order to 
withhold or withdraw from any such organization or its officers or 
employees any of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided for 
in this subchapter . . . or to condition or limit the enjoyment by any such 
organization or its officers or employees of any such privilege, 
exemption, or immunity.103 
According to congressional reports, those powers allowed the President to 
rectify any abuse of the immunities granted by the IOIA and, most 
importantly, permitted the President to limit an organization’s immunity in 
“the event that any international organization should engage . . . in activities 
of a commercial nature.”104 
C.  Getting to FSIA:  The Restrictive Theory of 
Sovereign Immunity in the United States 
The twentieth century witnessed a shift in international custom away 
from absolute sovereign immunity and towards a new theory of restrictive 
immunity.105  This theory was first introduced into U.S. law by the State 
Department,106 but was eventually codified in the FSIA.107  The following 
discussion covers the State Department’s adoption of restrictive immunity 
in the Tate Letter.  It then analyzes the political and procedural problems 
created by the State Department’s determination of foreign sovereign 
immunity and illustrates how those unique problems motivated Congress to 
pass the FSIA. 
1.  Changing International Custom and the Tate Letter 
In the wake of the Great Depression, many sovereign states were no 
longer reluctant to enter the commercial arena.108  As a result, throughout 
the twentieth century, sovereign nations assumed increasingly prominent 
roles in activities that had historically been the purview of private actors.109  
For example, state-sponsored trading companies and manufacturing 
interests became commonplace.110  However, this trend created a serious 
problem:  when states engaged in commercial transactions with private 
parties, the customary recognition of absolute immunity allowed foreign 
 
 102. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 3. 
 103. 22 U.S.C. § 288. 
 104. See S. REP. NO. 79-861, at 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 6. 
 105. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 450–51. 
 106. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 694. 
 107. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006); H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1487, at 45 (1976). 
 108. See Herz, supra note 14, at 505. 
 109. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 450. 
 110. See id. at 450–51. 
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sovereigns to breach contractual obligations with impunity.111  
Consequently, a corresponding movement naturally developed within 
international custom whereby foreign sovereign immunity was restricted to 
exclude certain activities.112  The purpose of this shift was to protect private 
parties from injury due to the acts of a foreign sovereign operating as a 
business, while preserving the sovereign’s privilege to act with immunity in 
an official manner.113  Under this new approach—termed the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity—a state retained immunity for its public acts 
but surrendered immunity when acting as a private party.114  Nearly all 
states adopted the restrictive theory of immunity by the latter half of the 
twentieth century.115 
As the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity gained prominence 
abroad, the State Department attempted to clarify the standard for sovereign 
immunity under U.S. law by publishing the Tate Letter in 1952.116  The 
Tate Letter is a memo that was written to the U.S. Attorney General by the 
Acting Legal Advisor for the State Department, Jack Tate.117  It indicated 
that the State Department would no longer recognize immunity for the 
private acts of foreign sovereigns and explained the key reasons for 
adopting this position.118  Those reasons included that a substantial number 
of states had already adopted the restrictive theory, that the United States no 
longer asserted immunity in foreign courts over its commercial activities 
abroad, and that U.S. citizens dealing with the increased number of states 
involved in commercial transactions deserved access to the courts.119 
 
 111. See Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del 
Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923 
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response to the “harsh and inequitable results” caused by the vision of absolute foreign 
sovereign immunity endorsed by The Schooner Exchange). 
 112. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451. 
 113. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 20, at 525. 
 114. See id.; see also FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 76, at 226. 
 115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 451 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]; FRANCK & GLENNON, supra note 
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Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 93, 93–94 (1953). 
 116. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Dep’t of State, to Philip B. 
Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 969, 984 (1952) 
[hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also Oparil, supra note 27, at 694.  While Ex parte Peru and 
Hoffman signaled that the United States no longer recognized absolute sovereign immunity, 
the extent of the new limitations was unclear.  The denial of immunity in Hoffman only 
implied that a state could be subject to U.S. jurisdiction absent a suggestion by the State 
Department that immunity was appropriate, whereas under the restrictive theory a state was 
liable when it chose to act as a private party. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451. 
 118. See id.; Oparil, supra note 27, at 694. 
 119. See Tate Letter, supra note 116, at 984–85; see also Swanson supra note 20, at 451. 
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2.  Politics in the Courts:  The State Department, Foreign Governments, 
and Private Citizens 
In principle, the Tate Letter meant that the restrictive theory was now the 
standard for determining sovereign immunity under U.S. law.120  The 
reality, however, was not as straightforward.  The courts continued to show 
deference to specific State Department determinations when they were 
made, but when the State Department was silent, courts interpreted the Tate 
Letter as the current expression of U.S. foreign policy and, within those 
parameters, applied their own understanding of restrictive immunity.121  
Consequently, two branches of government made sovereign immunity 
determinations based on a variety of factors with uneven results.122  The 
outcome was an inconsistent standard whereby courts would honor the 
State Department’s suggestion of immunity even when their own 
understanding of the Tate Letter would have led them to deny it.123 
Complicating this system was the inescapable reality that the executive 
branch and the State Department were political institutions responsive to 
the pressures and requirements of foreign relations.124  Foreign states were 
well aware that the responsibility for deciding questions of immunity rested 
primarily with the State Department, and that courts would grant immunity 
when it was recommended by the executive branch.125  Therefore, 
sovereign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department 
to encourage a recommendation of immunity regardless of whether 
immunity would be available under the restrictive theory.126  As a result, 
the State Department found itself having to factor diplomacy into its 
immunity considerations, on top of legal judgments about the customary 
international law of immunity.127  Understandably, the decisions made in 
many of these cases reflected politics more than the merits of the case, with 
inconsistent results for the private citizens bringing the claims.128 
 
 120. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451. 
 121. See id. at 451–52. 
 122. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). 
 123. See Swanson, supra note 20, at 451–52. 
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3.  A Single, Fair Standard:  FSIA, Judicial Determination, and the 
Removal of Diplomatic Pressure 
Congress passed the FSIA in 1976 in order to establish a reliable and 
definitive statutory baseline for when a foreign state could be subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction.129  The Act defines a foreign state as “not only the foreign 
state but also political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the 
foreign state.”130  Today, the FSIA is the standard for determining foreign 
sovereign immunity under U.S. law.131 
Technically, the FSIA was a reaffirmation of the principles first 
expressed in the Tate Letter, as its explicit purpose was to codify the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.132  Under the FSIA’s terms, 
foreign states are generally immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, 
unless one of the Act’s exceptions applies.133  In discussing international 
organizations and the IOIA, the two most important exceptions have been 
waiver by foreign states and actions involving commercial activities.134  
Under the FSIA, a foreign state surrenders its immunity from the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts when it “has waived its immunity either 
explicitly or by implication,” or the “action is based upon a commercial 
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state” or is otherwise 
connected to the United States.135 
An express waiver is generally understood to be a “clear and 
unambiguous intent to waive immunity,” so that the determination to 
surrender immunity is unmistakable.136  By comparison, Congress 
suggested that an implicit waiver would exist under the FSIA where a 
foreign state enters into a contract and agrees that the laws of another state 
should govern the agreement, or when a foreign state files a responsive 
pleading in an action without raising immunity as a defense.137 
Regarding the commercial activities exception, the FSIA provides that 
any determination should be based on the nature—not the purpose—of the 
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conduct.138  Courts have established that a state engages in commercial 
activity when it enters into the transactions that are generally open to 
private parties, as opposed to performing the public acts of a government 
that can only be done by a sovereign state.139  In developing the commercial 
exception, Congress suggested that “a foreign government’s sale of a 
service or a product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its 
employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or 
marketing agents, or its investment in a security of an American 
corporation,” would all be considered commercial activities.140 
While the FSIA can formally be viewed as a codification of the 
principles first expressed in the Tate Letter, the Act was also a direct 
attempt to remedy the problems of the former doctrine.141  The legislative 
history specifies that the FSIA would accomplish four goals:  First, it would 
codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.142  Second, it would 
remove the executive branch from sovereign immunity decisions and 
instead allow the judiciary to fairly evaluate claims without the pressures of 
foreign relations.143  Third, it would specify procedures for establishing 
jurisdiction over a foreign state.144  Fourth, it would create a mechanism for 
executing any judgment obtained against a foreign state.145 
Of these four goals, the legislative history suggests that removing foreign 
sovereign immunity determinations from the State Department’s control 
was the most important.146  Congress was concerned about the impact of 
foreign policy and diplomatic pressure on the State Department’s immunity 
determinations.147  By transforming those determinations into cases of 
statutory interpretation by the judiciary, Congress hoped that the FSIA 
would free the State Department from diplomatic pressure to recognize the 
immunity of foreign governments,148 and thereby assure litigants that 
immunity decisions involving foreign states would be made on purely legal 
grounds.149 
The only direct reference to international organizations in the FSIA can 
be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a), which precludes attachment and execution 
against the funds and other property of certain international 
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organizations.150  According to the legislative history, this reference was 
“not intended to restrict any immunity accorded to such international 
organizations under any other law or international agreement.”151  Instead, 
the purpose of the subsection was to protect international organizations 
designated by the President as deserving protection under the IOIA from 
“hindrance by private claimants seeking to attach the payment of funds to a 
foreign state.”152 
D.  The FSIA and the IOIA:  Uncertainty in the Law 
The enactment of the FSIA sparked a debate over the level of immunity 
provided to international organizations under the IOIA.153  On the one 
hand, nothing in the language or legislative history of the FSIA suggests 
that it was intended to apply to the IOIA.154  However, some courts and 
scholars have highlighted the IOIA’s reference to “the same immunity . . . 
as is enjoyed by foreign governments,”155 and pointed to a canon of 
statutory construction, which provides that a statute referring generally to 
an area of law adopts that law as it exists, including any subsequent 
amendment or modification.156  This section begins with a summary of 
scholarly opinion on the impact of the FSIA on the IOIA.  It then discusses 
a proposed amendment to the IOIA that would have directly incorporated 
the FSIA’s restrictive immunity standard.  Next, this section identifies 
subsequent State Department recommendations for the immunity of 
international organizations.  Finally, it discusses the initial post-FSIA IOIA 
decisions by the D.C. Circuit, which led to the development of the 
corresponding benefit test. 
1.  Scholars Debate the IOIA After the FSIA 
The FSIA makes only one reference to the IOIA, and that reference is 
silent on the standard of immunity the IOIA provides.157  Notwithstanding 
this silence, however, the IOIA’s general reference to sovereign immunity 
has led scholars to debate the FSIA’s impact on the immunity of 
international organizations.158  Some scholars have argued that when the 
79th Congress referenced “the same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign 
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governments,”159 it intended to adopt subsequent developments in 
sovereign immunity doctrine.160 This conclusion is often based on a well-
established canon of statutory construction that a “statute which refers to 
the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time 
the law was invoked . . . includ[ing] all the amendments and modifications 
of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted.”161  
Therefore, according to this interpretation, the IOIA should adopt the FSIA 
as a modification of sovereign immunity.162 
By contrast, other scholars point to the plain language of the FSIA and its 
legislative history to argue that the FSIA was enacted to address concerns 
unrelated to the immunity of international organizations.163  These scholars 
focus on two points:  First, the FSIA expressly lists the entities and 
activities that it meant to affect.164  And second, Congress’s concerns about 
the impact of diplomatic and foreign policy pressure on the State 
Department’s immunity determinations do not apply equally to 
international organizations.165 
Regarding the first point, these scholars argue that the FSIA applies, on 
its face, only to “foreign states” or to “agenc[ies] or instrumentalit[ies] of a 
foreign state.”166  The FSIA includes specific definitions for these entities, 
and these definitions do not include international organizations.167  
Therefore, a plain reading of the FSIA demonstrates the express intent to 
alter sovereign immunity, while the FSIA’s silence on international 
organizations indicates that Congress did not intend to disturb the IOIA.168  
This conclusion is supported by the FSIA’s primary purpose, which was to 
adopt the restrictive theory of immunity and thereby address the increased 
commercial activities of foreign governments.169 
Turning to their second point, these scholars assert that the FSIA was 
passed in order to establish a default rule for sovereign immunity that 
would apply equally to all foreign countries and remove the effect of 
political calculations by the State Department.170  However, because the 
United States is a member, if not the leading member, of every organization 
covered by the IOIA, the impact of politics in determining the 
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organization’s immunity is very different than the pressures created by the 
lobbying of foreign governments.171  Therefore, these scholars assert that 
Congress entrusted the task of monitoring the immunity of international 
organizations to the President, rather than transferring those determinations 
to the judiciary.172 
However, despite disagreement over the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA, 
there is a growing acknowledgement that the immunity of international 
organizations should be subject to some limitations.173  Specifically, there 
appears to be a consensus among scholars that international organizations 
should adhere to the general principles and customs of international law, 
which increasingly include the theory of restrictive immunity.174 
2.  Working Toward a Solution:  A Legislative Proposal to Amend the IOIA 
In 1990, a bill was proposed that would have expressly amended the 
IOIA so that international organizations would be entitled to immunity 
under the FSIA.175  Senator Roth of Delaware introduced the bill, which 
specified that, “[f]or purposes of [the IOIA], the phrase ‘same immunity 
from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments’ means the same immunity to which foreign states are entitled 
under [the FSIA].”176  The bill also would have amended the FSIA so that it 
would clearly apply to recognized international organizations.177  In 
introducing the bill, Senator Roth stated, “I believe that restrictive 
immunity as defined [in the FSIA] is in the best interest of domestic 
corporations . . . .  For this reason I am introducing a bill to amend the 
[IOIA] to restrict the jurisdictional immunity to which certain international 
organizations are entitled.”178  The bill never passed and was not proposed 
again.179 
3.  The State Department Weighs In 
In 1980, four years after the FSIA was passed, the General Counsel of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Leroy D. Clark, requested an 
opinion from the State Department regarding U.S. jurisdiction over an 
 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 14, at 472; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 70, 
at 1181–83. 
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 176. S. RES. 2715, 101st Cong. (1990); Oparil, supra note 27, at 707. 
 177. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 707. 
 178. 136 Cong. Rec. 13409 (1990); see also Oparil, supra note 27, at 708. 
 179. See Oparil, supra note 27, at 708.  The bill was introduced to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, but was not reported by the Committee in 1990 and was not subsequently re-
introduced. See id. 
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employee discrimination proceeding involving the World Bank.180  In 
response, Robert Owen, the Legal Advisor of the State Department, issued 
a statement recommending that the same restrictive immunity conferred on 
foreign governments in the FSIA should be applied to international 
organizations.181  His letter acknowledged the widespread adoption of the 
restrictive theory of immunity under international law, as codified in the 
United States by the FSIA, by virtue of which “international organizations 
are now subject to the jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their 
commercial activities, while retaining immunity for their acts of a public 
character.”182  The State Department has issued similar statements in 
response to all subsequent requests.183 
4.  The D.C. Circuit and the Development of the 
Corresponding Benefit Test 
The D.C. Circuit has played a central role in the development of the 
IOIA.184  Due to its location, the D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction over all suits 
filed against international organizations that are headquartered in 
Washington, D.C.185  As a result, it has heard almost all of the cases 
involving IOIA immunity claims.186 
Though the FSIA was passed in 1976, its impact on the immunity of 
international organizations was not addressed by a federal appellate court 
until 1980, when the D.C. Circuit decided Broadbent v. Organization of 
American States.187  However, the court sidestepped the question of which 
immunity standard should apply by concluding that the OAS was immune 
from the suit under either standard.188 
 The claim in Broadbent was brought by former employees of the OAS, 
who were dismissed as part of a general downsizing effort by the 
organization.189  The employees argued that the “same immunity” language 
of the IOIA tied the immunity of international organizations to that of 
foreign sovereigns, including all subsequent amendments and 
modifications.190  In contrast, the OAS asserted that the IOIA granted 
absolute immunity, and that Congress did not modify that grant when it 
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 188. See Herz, supra note 14, at 494. 
 189. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 28. 
 190. See id. at 31. 
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passed the FSIA.191  The court agreed with the OAS and highlighted several 
arguments in support of this position:  First, the FSIA generally fails to 
mention international organizations.192  Second, the text of the IOIA clearly 
provides for modification of an organization’s immunity by the President, 
who is empowered to withdraw or restrict the privileges granted by the 
statute.193  And third, the legislative history suggests that the policies and 
considerations that led Congress to pass the FSIA do not apply to 
international organizations like the OAS.194 
However, the court found that it did not have to resolve the impact of the 
FSIA on the IOIA; rather, it reasoned that under either theory of 
immunity—absolute or restrictive—the OAS was insulated from the 
employees’ suit.195  In the court’s view, employment of internal clerical 
personnel by either a foreign sovereign or international organization was 
not a commercial activity, and therefore, the FSIA exception did not 
apply.196  Instead, the court turned to the waiver prong of the IOIA and 
found that the OAS had clearly intended claims by employees to be 
resolved through its Administrative Tribunal.197  Therefore, the OAS had 
therefore not waived its immunity, and the case was dismissed without a 
ruling on the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA.198 
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id.  Only one section, § 1611, makes any explicit reference to international 
organizations.  It discusses the attachment of an organization’s property—which could 
equally be the result of restrictive immunity under FSIA or a waiver by the organization 
itself. See id.; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006). 
 193. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 32. The statute states: 
The President [is] authorized, in the light of the functions performed by any such 
international organization, by appropriate Executive order to withhold or withdraw 
from any such organization or its officers or employees any of the privileges, 
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such privilege, exemption, or immunity. 
International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006). 
 194. See Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 32.  Historically, the court noted, the absolute immunity 
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foreign nation and consequently embarrass the executive branch’s management of foreign 
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restrictive immunity to international organizations, as the commercial activities of those 
organizations remained limited to those necessary for the organizations’ chartered functions, 
and other nations did not generally apply the concept of restrictive immunity to them. See id. 
at 33. 
 195. See id. at 32–33. 
 196. See id. at 35. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at 35–36.  The court determined that the OAS Tribunal was competent to 
determine the lawfulness of an employee’s termination and to provide adequate relief.  
Because the OAS clearly intended to handle all employee suits internally, there was no 
question that they had not expressly waived that right.  See id. 
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The D.C. Circuit was faced with a similar situation three years later, 
when it heard Mendaro v. World Bank.199  In Mendaro, a former employee 
brought a suit against the World Bank, which claimed immunity.200  In its 
decision, the D.C. Circuit avoided the FSIA altogether.  Building on 
Broadbent, the court found that it was a well-established principle of 
international law that an international organization is entitled to “such 
privileges and such immunity from the jurisdiction of a member state as are 
necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes of the organization.”201  The 
court further determined that the immunity of international organizations 
from suits by employees arising from the employee relationship, was “[o]ne 
of the most important protections granted to international organizations.”202  
This immunity served an essential and additional purpose beyond functional 
necessity—to protect international organizations from control by one 
member state over the internal activities of the organization.203  Therefore, 
the court found that the World Bank was immune from employment suits 
regardless of the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA, and turned instead to whether 
that immunity had been waived.204 
The court interpreted the IOIA’s requirement of an express waiver to 
imply that courts should be “reluctant” to find that an organization had 
waived immunity.205  The court acknowledged that the World Bank had not 
expressly waived its immunity to “this particular suit.”206  The court next 
reasoned that because the purpose for according immunity to international 
organizations is to enable them to fulfill their chartered functions, it 
followed that “most organizations would be unwilling to relinquish their 
immunity without receiving a corresponding benefit which would further 
the organization’s goals.”207  Because an organization was unlikely to 
intend a waiver that could “significantly hamper” its proper functions,208 
the court distinguished a waiver of immunity for commercial activities, 
which would allow the World Bank to enter into contracts and agreements 
by creating liability for breach, from an employment-based exception, 
which would create liability without a corresponding benefit.  For example, 
the World Bank’s credibility as a guarantor of securities would be 
meaningless without a right to sue to enforce the World Bank’s contracts.209  
By comparison, a waiver of immunity for suits by employees over internal 
operations presented no corresponding benefit and would actually harm the 
World Bank’s ability to operate by subjecting its internal operations to the 
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judicial scrutiny of a member state.210  Consequently, the court found that 
the World Bank had not intended to limit its immunity to suits involving the 
internal administration of its employees.211 
5.  Breaking the Silence: Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim 
In the aftermath of Broadbent and Mendaro, the impact of the FSIA on 
the IOIA remained unresolved for over a decade.212  Finally, in 1997 the 
District Court for the District of Columbia provided the first explicit answer 
when it heard an employee’s claims of assault and battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim.213  The court ultimately 
denied the IFC’s motion to dismiss, asserting that “the ‘same immunity’ 
language of the IOIA should be read to incorporate the changes to foreign 
sovereign immunity enacted in FSIA.”214 
The court began with a determination that the IOIA’s operative language 
provided “broad” immunity for organizations at the time the Act was 
passed.215  The court next highlighted that, since 1976, the FSIA has 
provided the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign 
government in a United States court.”216  As a result, the FSIA currently 
defines the immunity of foreign states.217  The court further acknowledged 
that the impact of the FSIA on the IOIA was an “unsettled question,” and 
that the D.C. Circuit had so far avoided a decision because the international 
organizations at issue had been immune from suit whether or not the FSIA 
applied.218  But here, the court asserted that the IFC would not be entitled to 
immunity under the FSIA because the suit fell within one of the Act’s 
exceptions, and therefore, the court had to decide whether the FSIA applies 
to international organizations like the IFC through the IOIA.219 
The court recognized that there were “sound reasons” for affording 
absolute immunity to international organizations.220  However, it found 
itself ultimately “constrained” by the plain language of the IOIA.221  In 
support of its holding, the court evoked the canon of statutory interpretation 
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cited in Broadbent, that “[a] statute which refers to the law of a subject 
generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law was invoked 
. . . includ[ing] all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent 
to the time the reference statute was enacted.”222  Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that Congress understood what it was doing when it passed the 
FSIA and could have revised the IOIA to reaffirm the absolute immunity of 
international organizations.223  Congress’s inaction signaled that the 
restrictive immunity provided under the FSIA “was to apply in like fashion 
to international organizations.”224 
As a result of the district court’s decision in Rendall-Speranza, it 
appeared that the D.C. Circuit would finally have to address the impact of 
the FSIA on the IOIA.  However, the circuit court again avoided a direct 
ruling225—opting instead to dismiss the claim on procedural grounds—
thereby leaving the FSIA’s impact on the IOIA an open question.226 
II.  THE D.C. AND THIRD CIRCUITS SPLIT 
Rendall-Speranza was not the last word, however; instead, two circuit 
courts are currently split over the meaning of the IOIA’s “same immunity” 
language.  Part II examines this circuit split in detail.  It begins with an 
examination of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Atkinson, which held that the 
IOIA created a baseline absolute immunity standard.  It then addresses the 
Third Circuit’s decision in OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency,227 
which held that the IOIA incorporated subsequent amendments to sovereign 
immunity, including the FSIA. 
A.  The D.C. Circuit:  Qualifying Absolute 
The following discussion examines Atkinson, the D.C. Circuit’s first 
direct ruling on the standard of immunity granted by the IOIA.  It then 
briefly examines two subsequent cases—one also from the D.C. Circuit and 
one from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—that reaffirmed and adopted 
Atkinson’s holding.   
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1.  Absolute and Equivocal:  The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Atkinson v. 
Inter-American Development Bank 
In Atkinson, the D.C. Circuit court held that the World Bank was entitled 
to absolute immunity under the IOIA from a garnishment proceeding 
brought by the wife of a former employee to satisfy state judgments against 
the husband for child support and alimony.228  However, in contrast to the 
district court in Rendall-Speranza, the circuit court did not find the canon of 
statutory interpretation to be conclusive; rather, the court highlighted 
alternative theories in the IOIA’s legislative history and text that persuaded 
the court that the IOIA was not tied to the FSIA.229 
The court interpreted the IOIA’s “same immunity” language as 
legislative shorthand for the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and 
consequently construed the phrase as a reference to the law governing the 
immunity of foreign states.230  Therefore, the main issue according to the 
D.C. Circuit was whether the 79th Congress intended the IOIA to refer only 
to foreign sovereign immunity law as it existed in 1945, or to also 
incorporate subsequent amendments including the FSIA.231  Importantly, 
the court determined that foreign sovereigns enjoyed “virtually absolute 
immunity” when Congress enacted the IOIA in 1945.232 
The court then addressed the statutory canon upon which the district 
court in Rendall-Speranza relied,233 finding that such a canon is only 
appropriate where the statutory language is ambiguous.234  The court 
acknowledged that the text of the IOIA provided no express guidance on 
whether Congress intended the Act to adopt subsequent changes to 
sovereign immunity.235  However, the court found that the IOIA’s emphasis 
on Presidential oversight was persuasive evidence that Congress “was 
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content to delegate to the President the responsibility for updating the 
immunities of international organizations in the face of changing 
circumstances.”236  The court noted that the IOIA only applies to 
organizations designated by the President and that the President retains the 
power to withdraw or limit the immunity granted by the IOIA to 
international organizations.237  Consequently, the court found that the 
IOIA’s inclusion of an explicit mechanism for monitoring and updating the 
immunities of international organizations “by appropriate Executive Order” 
clearly undermined the claim that Congress intended the IOIA to be 
automatically revised in accordance with developments in foreign sovereign 
immunity law.238 
In support of its position, the court pointed to the legislative history of 
the IOIA.  The court cited a Senate report, which characterized the 
provision delegating authority to the President to modify an organization’s 
immunity as “permit[ting] the adjustment or limitation of the privileges in 
the event that any international organization should engage, for example, in 
activities of a commercial nature.”239  The court noted that the report 
clearly suggested that the responsibility for modifying the IOIA rested with 
the President–acting through a formal proclamation or executive order and 
not with a separate evolving body of law.  Further, the court explained that 
the delegation of authority was done with the foresight that international 
organizations might engage in commercial activities.240 
Consequently, the D.C. Circuit found that the IOIA accorded the same 
immunity to international organizations as was enjoyed by foreign 
sovereigns in 1945.241  Furthermore, the court determined that the 1945 
standard operated as a baseline, defined as absolute immunity by the court’s 
analysis of the history of U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law, which could 
subsequently be modified only by a formal executive order altering 
immunity under the IOIA.242 
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The court next looked to whether the FSIA was intended to modify the 
IOIA.  First, it dismissed the argument, put forth in Rendall-Speranza, that 
by choosing not to revise the IOIA when it passed the FSIA, Congress 
expressed its intent to apply restrictive immunity to international 
organizations.243  The court’s response was that Congress did not express 
its intent by failing to act and that, in any case, the will of a later Congress 
is of little relevance to the meaning of a law enacted by an earlier 
Congress.244  Second, the court addressed the claim that, by prohibiting 
“attachment or any other judicial process impeding the disbursement of 
funds [held by an IOIA-protected entity] to . . . a foreign state as the result 
of an action brought in the courts of the United States,” the FSIA permits a 
negative inference that funds held by an international organization could be 
dispersed to a non-foreign state (such as a private individual).245  The court 
rejected this interpretation, finding that, if anything, Congress intended to 
clarify that international organizations deserved special protection.246  
Therefore, the court determined that the FSIA had no impact on the 
IOIA.247 
The D.C. Circuit also addressed whether the World Bank had waived any 
immunity it might be entitled to in defense of a garnishment action under 
the IOIA.248  The World Bank’s charter provides:  “Actions may be brought 
against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories 
of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the 
purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or 
guaranteed securities.”249  The court noted that it rejected reading an 
identical provision as a blanket waiver of immunity in Mendaro.250  
Instead, it again applied the corresponding benefit test to determine whether 
the Bank’s charter should be construed as a waiver of immunity.251  In 
doing so, the court reformulated the test to say that “the Bank’s immunity 
should be construed as not waived unless the particular type of suit would 
further the Bank’s objectives.”252  The court found that a waiver of 
immunity from garnishment proceedings provided “no conceivable benefit” 
 
should be limited to the same restrictive immunity as sovereign foreign states. See id. at 
1341–43; supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A and III.C. 
 243. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1342; see also supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1342. 
 245. See id. (quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1611 
(2006)). 
 246. See id.  The court emphasized that the passage comes within a list of exceptions 
where the property of foreign states can be attached and therefore serves only to clarify that 
these exceptions do not apply to property held by international organizations where there is a 
foreign state judgment debtor. See id. 
 247. See id. at 1341–42. 
 248. See id. at 1337. 
 249. Agreement Establishing The Inter-American Development Bank art. 11, § 3, Apr. 8, 
1959, 10 U.S.T. 3068, 389 U.N.T.S. 69. 
 250. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1338 (citing Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 614–
15 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. 
270 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
to the World Bank, unlike a waiver for commercial transactions, which 
would allow an organization to perform the ordinary activities needed to 
operate.253  Therefore, the court concluded that the World Bank had not 
waived its absolute immunity against this suit.254 
2.  Living with Atkinson:  Waiving Absolute Immunity Under the 
Corresponding Benefit Test 
In 2009, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its Atkinson holding in Osseiran v. 
International Finance Corporation.255  In Osseiran, the IFC claimed 
immunity under the IOIA in an action for promissory estoppel and breach 
of confidentiality in a commercial transaction.256  The court did not 
challenge the IFC’s claim that it was entitled to absolute immunity under 
the IOIA, but instead found that it had waived immunity through its charter 
under the corresponding benefit test.257  Examining the same charter 
language that it had in Mendaro and Atkinson and following its own 
arguments from those cases, the court reasoned that immunity from suits 
based on commercial transactions would harm an organization’s ability to 
fulfill its fundamental goals by hindering its capacity to operate in the 
marketplace.258  By contrast, the court found that the IFC could identify no 
countervailing costs to suggest that immunity should not be waived.259  
Therefore, the court found that the IFC had waived its absolute immunity 
under the IOIA for commercial transactions.260 
In addition to the D.C. Circuit, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also 
followed the Atkinson holding.  In BRO Tech Corp. v. European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development,261 the district court addressed a dispute 
over an investment made in a Romanian corporation.262  The court 
identified the major issue to be the level of immunity provided to the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European Bank) by 
the IOIA after the passage of the FSIA.263  In resolving the issue, the 
district court explicitly “adopt[ed] the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, and 
[found] that the [European Bank was] entitled to absolute immunity under 
 
 253. See id. at 1338–39.  Since Atkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly rejected the 
“constructive waiver” theory. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. 
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FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 927 (6th ed. 2009). 
 254. See Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1338–39. 
 255. 552 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 256. Osseiran, 552 F.3d at 838. 
 257. See id. at 840–41. 
 258. See id. at 840. 
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 260. See id. at 840–41. 
 261. No. CIV.A.00-2160, 2000 WL 1751094 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2000). 
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the IOIA, contingent on any waiver of that immunity.”264  The district court 
then applied the D.C. Circuit’s corresponding benefit test and found that the 
financial security provided by a waiver of immunity for commercial 
transactions was necessary for the European Bank to attract investors.265  
As a result, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the European 
Bank was entitled to absolute immunity, but had waived its immunity for 
commercial dealings.266 
B.  A Canon Is a Powerful Weapon:  The Third Circuit Adopts Restrictive 
Immunity in OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency 
Following more than a decade in which Atkinson was the authoritative 
word on the immunity of international organizations, the Third Circuit—
weighing in on this issue for the first time—rekindled the debate when it 
rejected the Atkinson interpretation in OSS Nokalva.267  The following 
discussion examines the Third Circuit’s decision in that case and its holding 
that the FSIA’s restrictive immunity does extend to international 
organizations under the IOIA.268  
OSS Nokalva concerned a breach of contract action brought by a software 
developer against the European Space Agency (ESA).269  In response, the 
ESA claimed that it was protected from the suit by the IOIA’s grant of 
absolute immunity.270 
In evaluating the effect of the FSIA on the IOIA, the court observed that 
the “same immunity” language of the IOIA clearly showed that “Congress 
was legislating in shorthand.”271  The result was to link the immunity of 
international organizations to the immunity of foreign governments 
provided by the FSIA.272  In so finding, the Third Circuit contrasted its 
approach with the D.C. Circuit in Atkinson.273  The court recognized that 
Atkinson had dismissed the importance of the reference canon and had 
instead relied heavily on the President’s authority to regulate the immunity 
provided by the IOIA.274  However, the Third Circuit found “nothing in the 
statutory language or legislative history” to suggest that the President’s 
authority under the IOIA precluded incorporation of subsequent changes in 
sovereign immunity.275  According to the court, the Senate report cited in 
Atkinson merely evidenced the kind of changes that the President could 
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make, but was silent as to whether the immunity granted by the IOIA was 
otherwise “frozen” in time.276 
To support its interpretation, the Third Circuit pointed to the State 
Department’s support for applying the same restrictive standard of 
immunity provided under the FSIA to international organizations through 
the IOIA.277  Furthermore, the court highlighted the fact that nearly half of 
all international organizations designated by the President as receiving 
immunity under the IOIA came into existence after Congress enacted the 
FSIA in 1976.278  The court thus determined that it was illogical to grant 
absolute immunity to those international organizations that first received 
immunity under the IOIA after foreign sovereign immunity had already 
been limited to restrictive immunity by the FSIA.279  Likewise, the court 
found that it was unreasonable that a “group of states acting through an 
international organization is entitled to broader immunity than its member 
states enjoy when acting alone.”280  In addition, the court pointed out that 
Congress could have expressly tethered the immunity of international 
organizations to 1945 if it had actually intended the IOIA to be frozen in 
time.281  However, without express language indicating such an intention, 
the Third Circuit found that the IOIA should be interpreted in light of the 
usual reference canon “to mean that Congress intended that the immunity 
conferred by the IOIA would adapt with the law of foreign sovereign 
immunity,” and therefore, that the IOIA incorporated the FSIA.282 
Because the FSIA applied to international organizations, the court found 
that the ESA could be held liable for breach of contract because the suit met 
the FSIA’s commercial exception.283  The result was that the Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding, denying the ESA’s motion to 
dismiss.284   
III.  REREADING THE IOIA TO PROVIDE A FLEXIBLE STANDARD OF 
IMMUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The split between the D.C. and Third Circuits ultimately comes down to 
a dispute over dates.  In Atkinson, the D.C Circuit argued that the IOIA’s 
reference to foreign sovereign immunity was frozen in time, so that 
international organizations were entitled to the same level of immunity 
 
 276. See id. at 763 n.5; see also supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
 277. See OSS Nokalva, 617 F.3d at 763–64.  The court quoted the letter written by Robert 
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granted to foreign sovereigns in 1945.285  By contrast the Third Circuit 
found that the IOIA was linked to the evolving doctrine of U.S. foreign 
sovereign immunity law, and therefore, that the restrictive theory of 
immunity adopted by the FSIA in 1976 applied to international 
organizations.286  Thus, behind each circuit’s decision lies the same 
determination:  that the IOIA must be defined through a specific application 
of U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law.  However, a close reading of the 
historical record does not support this conclusion.  Instead, the evidence 
suggests that when the IOIA referred to the “same immunity . . . as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments,” it was not adopting a specific level of 
foreign sovereign immunity; rather, it was referring to the process by which 
a foreign government received its immunity.287  This interpretation not only 
reflects the understanding that foreign sovereign immunity was a political 
determination in 1945—rather than a specific legal standard—but more 
closely comports with the statute when read as a whole. 
Part III.A evaluates the Atkinson decision and argues that foreign states 
were not entitled to absolute immunity in 1945.  It also explains that the 
corresponding benefit test is inconsistent with the IOIA’s requirement of an 
express waiver.  Part III.B turns to OSS Nokalva and explains that the IOIA 
was not intended to reference foreign sovereign immunity as a body of law.  
Finally, Part III.C proposes a new interpretation of the IOIA, wherein courts 
would show deference to immunity determinations by the executive branch 
for international organizations.  In the short term, this new conception 
would not disturb the general consensus that international organizations 
should be held liable for commercial transactions.  However, unlike the 
current circuit decisions, it would allow the executive branch to alter 
immunity levels when necessary for the security or interests of the United 
States. 
A.  Shifting Standards and Missing Words:  Reevaluating the 
D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Atkinson 
The following sections reevaluate the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Atkinson.  
First, the assertion that foreign sovereigns were entitled to absolute 
immunity in 1945 fails to take into account changes to U.S. foreign 
sovereign immunity law in the 1930s and 1940s.  Second, the application of 
the corresponding benefit test to the IOIA is incompatible with the IOIA’s 
requirement that waivers of immunity be express. 
 
 285. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2006); supra 
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1.  Absolute Immunity Was Not the Standard for 
Sovereign Immunity in 1945 
In reaching its decision in Atkinson, the D.C. Circuit found that when the 
IOIA was passed in 1945, foreign sovereigns were entitled to absolute 
immunity.288  This initial conclusion informed the rest of the decision and 
led the court to conclude that international organizations still enjoyed 
absolute immunity unless they had waived their privilege either expressly 
or through the corresponding benefit test.289  However, while sovereign 
immunity had been virtually absolute for most of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the standard was markedly different by the time the 
IOIA was passed in December 1945.290 
For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. foreign 
sovereign immunity law was common law set by federal courts.291  Under 
this system, U.S. courts consistently granted absolute immunity to 
sovereign foreign states for all of their acts, including those that were 
commercial in nature.292  This practice began with The Schooner Exchange 
and reached its height in the 1920s with Pesaro, when the Supreme Court 
ignored a State Department recommendation and determined that foreign 
sovereigns were entitled to absolute immunity for their public and private 
acts.293  It is likely that the Atkinson court looked to this compelling history 
when it determined that foreign governments enjoyed absolute immunity in 
U.S. courts in 1945.294 
 Foreign sovereign immunity underwent a significant change, however, 
between the start of the Great Depression and the end of World War II.295  
During this time period, the Court gradually transitioned to a “realist” 
approach that was more politically conscious, as well as deferential to 
executive branch determinations in all matters of foreign policy.296  
Specifically, in Ex parte Peru and Hoffman the Court effectively repudiated 
Pesaro’s conclusion that a sovereign government could be entitled to 
immunity without a positive determination by the executive branch.297  
Consequently, by 1945, foreign governments no longer enjoyed absolute 
immunity under U.S. law; rather, courts deferred to executive branch 
(typically State Department) recommendations of foreign sovereign 
immunity in specific cases.298  Therefore, if the IOIA was intended to 
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afford the same immunity as was extended to foreign states in 1945, it 
could not have been intended to provide absolute immunity. 
2.  The Requirement of Express Waiver:  Addressing the 
Corresponding Benefit Test 
While the D.C. Circuit determined that international organizations were 
still entitled to absolute immunity under the language of the IOIA, it also 
utilized the corresponding benefit test to determine when a constructive 
waiver was appropriate.299  Specifically, in Atkinson the court hypothesized 
that the corresponding benefit test would apply when international 
organizations engaged in commercial transactions, because private parties 
would be reluctant to trade without a legal remedy.  Therefore, those 
organizations must necessarily have intended to include a commercial 
waiver in their charters.300 
The problem with this test is fairly simple:  necessary or not, you cannot 
have an implicit, express waiver.  The IOIA states that international 
organizations are entitled to the same immunity as foreign governments, 
“except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their 
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any 
contract.”301  Therefore, the IOIA only allows for the express waiver of 
immunity.302  Unlike constructive or implicit waivers, which can be 
conveyed through actions or overall intentions, an express waiver is 
generally understood to require a “clear and unambiguous” desire to waive 
immunity, so that the waiver’s meaning is unmistakable.303  When a 
balancing test and judicial inquiry is needed to determine whether an 
organization intended to waive its immunity to a particular suit, such a 
waiver is not unambiguous.  Instead, where an organization has been found 
to have immunity under the IOIA, that immunity has not been waived 
unless the organization has demonstrated an unmistakable intent—such as 
in a contract or other legal document—to surrender immunity for a given 
transaction, activity, or specific suit.304 
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Furthermore, the corresponding benefit test is not necessary for 
organizations to properly function.305  Absent a general provision in the 
charter, private parties are free to insist that an immunity waiver is 
expressly included in their contract with the organization.306  Similarly, if 
an international organization were to find a particular immunity 
counterproductive, it could unilaterally waive that immunity either through 
an express provision or by declining to assert immunity in court.307 
B.  OSS Nokalva Take-Two:  Distinguishing the IOIA from 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit found that the IOIA was 
a reference statute tied to U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law and thereby 
adopted all subsequent amendments including the FSIA.308  However, the 
conclusion that the phrase, “same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments” in the IOIA signaled the intention to adopt sovereign 
immunity law, cannot be reconciled with the legislative history of the IOIA 
and the purposes for granting immunity to international organizations.309  
The following discussion explains why the IOIA was not intended as a pure 
reference statute; rather, the immunity of international organizations was 
intended to evolve separately from foreign sovereign immunity. 
Congressional reports discussing the bill assert that the basic purpose of 
the IOIA was to “confer upon international organizations . . . privileges and 
immunities of a governmental nature.”310  Therefore, it was expected that 
the privileges granted to international organizations would be “similar” to 
those granted to foreign governments and their officials.311  The immunities 
would not, however, be the same, because the purpose for granting 
immunity to international organizations was different than that for granting 
immunity to foreign sovereigns.312  Specifically, in considering the IOIA, 
Congress relied upon a State Department assurance that the immunities 
granted to international organizations and their officials would be “more 
limited” than those extended to foreign governments.313  For example, the 
immunity of officers and officials of international organizations would be 
constrained to acts performed in their official capacity, whereas the 
diplomatic officers of foreign nations enjoyed full immunity from legal 
process.314 
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These differences reflected two key factors.  The first was that the IOIA 
reflected different policy concerns than those behind the enactment of the 
FSIA.315  The FSIA was passed in order to establish a default rule for 
sovereign immunity that would apply equally to all foreign countries and 
free the State Department from the political liability of its immunity 
decisions.316  But, the purpose for granting immunity to international 
organizations is to secure their legal and practical independence, so that 
they could operate without undue interference by the laws of member 
states.317 
This concern was particularly relevant in relation to the United States, 
whose role as the host nation for many these organizations left them 
especially vulnerable to pressures by the U.S. government and suits under 
U.S. law.318  In effect, the FSIA was passed to free the U.S. government 
from pressure by foreign states, while the IOIA was passed to free 
international organizations from intrusion by the United States.319  
Specifically, the IOIA was passed to assure the international community 
that suitable conditions were in place to protect the legal and practical 
independence of these organizations from overly burdensome interference 
when the United States was the host country.320  In exchange, the IOIA 
served the self-interest of the United States by allowing it to host key 
organizations like the U.N., protecting it as a member-nation from liability 
for the organizations’ actions within the United States and strengthening the 
position of other organizations of which the United States was a member, 
but not the host nation.321 
Another difference between the immunity of foreign governments and 
that of international organizations is that Congress expected the executive 
branch to manage immunity under the IOIA in a way that it explicitly 
rejected in the FSIA.322  This different treatment is a reflection of the fact 
that the United States is a member of any organization covered by the IOIA, 
and therefore, immunity determinations under the IOIA involve different 
pressures and concerns than those created by foreign sovereign immunity 
determinations.323  Thus, rather than equating international organizations to 
foreign nations, a more appropriate analogy might be to U.S. agencies.  
Under U.S. law, federal agencies enjoy limited, functional immunity for 
their acts.324  Under the Federal Tort Claims Act325 (FTCA), U.S. agencies 
can generally be held liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of their 
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employees acting within the scope of their employment, but they maintain 
immunity under the discretionary function exception for acts or omissions 
caused by the policy decisions of an agency.326  In Dalehite v. United 
States,327 the Supreme Court defined the discretionary function necessity 
as, “the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to 
one’s judgment of the best course . . . .  Where there is room for policy 
judgment and decision there is discretion.”328  This conception of immunity 
is akin to the traditional understanding of the immunity of international 
organizations under the functional necessity doctrine, by which 
organizations enjoy those limited immunities necessary to provide 
organizations with the independence and discretionary authority “necessary 
for the fulfillment of their purposes,” without risking liability under the 
laws of its member states.329 
Moreover, the idea that Congress intended to grant the President 
discretion to manage and, if necessary, to amend the immunity granted to 
international organizations under the IOIA is clear from the historical 
record.  In recommending the bill’s passage, the House Committee on Ways 
and Means found that the “interests of the United States are adequately 
protected . . . [by the] broad powers granted to the President.”330  The IOIA 
authorizes the President “to withhold or withdraw from any such 
organization or its officers or employees any of the privileges, exemptions, 
and immunities provided for in this title . . . or to condition or limit the 
enjoyment by any such organization” of immunity.”331  According to the 
legislative history, this language was intended to provide the President with 
the powers necessary to rectify any abuse of the immunities granted by the 
IOIA, including the ability to limit an organization’s immunity in “the event 
that any international organization should engage . . . in activities of a 
commercial nature.”332  Therefore, by granting the authority to withhold or 
condition the immunity of international organizations to the executive 
branch, Congress clearly established a complete mechanism for amending 
the IOIA to reflect changes in domestic or international custom outside of 
U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law.333 
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C.  Simple, Workable, and Flexible:  Executive Determination of the 
Immunity of International Organizations 
The current interpretations of the IOIA and the immunity of international 
organizations should be reworked.  The D.C. Circuit’s absolute immunity 
standard from Atkinson does not reflect the complicated reality of foreign 
sovereign immunity law when the IOIA was passed in 1945.334  Likewise, 
the Third Circuit’s proposal improperly treats the IOIA’s reference to the 
immunity of foreign governments as an intention to adopt a particular level 
of sovereign immunity and all subsequent amendments to that immunity, 
rather than an allusion to the general type of immunity being conveyed.335   
Instead, the “same immunity” reference of the IOIA should be read as 
extending the judicial deference to executive branch determinations that 
defined foreign sovereign immunity in 1945.336  Under this interpretation, 
the FSIA has no direct effect on the IOIA.  The following sections explain 
this Note’s proposed interpretation of the IOIA.   
1.  The Proposed Standard Is Consistent with a Plain Reading of the IOIA 
When the IOIA was passed in 1945, there was no single legal standard 
for foreign sovereign immunity.337  The changes in the Supreme Court’s 
approach to foreign affairs from 1938 through 1945 transformed the 
immunity of foreign governments from a legal question answered by the 
courts independent of executive branch recommendations, into a political 
issue determined by the executive branch in accordance with U.S. foreign 
policy.338  Therefore, when the IOIA granted the “same immunity . . . as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments” to international organizations, it was not 
referencing a body of law, whether fixed or evolving.339  Instead, the 
IOIA’s reference to foreign governments reinforced the overall intention 
that the immunity of international organizations should be determined 
through a similar type of executive branch or State Department scrutiny as 
was then applied to immunity requests by foreign states.340 
This interpretation is consistent with a plain reading of the IOIA.  Both 
Atkinson and OSS Nokalva treated the “same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by 
foreign governments” as the principal immunity language of the IOIA, 
while the President’s authority to limit immunity was treated, like waiver, 
as an exception. 341  Put another way, the interpretations offered by the D.C. 
and Third Circuits read the IOIA as granting some specific level of foreign 
sovereign immunity, which can be further limited either by waiver or by 
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Presidential action.342  Instead, courts should follow the natural 
construction of the statute and treat section 1 of the IOIA as the principal 
provision, which establishes that the President decides which organizations 
get immunity and in what circumstances that immunity should be 
withdrawn or limited.343  Section 2 then clarifies section 1 by defining what 
is meant by “international organizations,” and signaling that the President 
should apply the same type of analysis used to evaluate immunity requests 
by foreign governments when determining the immunity of international 
organizations.344 
2.  Current Executive Branch Determinations Would Hold International 
Organizations Accountable for Their Commercial Activities 
In addressing the effect of the FSIA on the IOIA, some scholars have 
argued that there is an emerging consensus that international organizations 
should adhere to the general principles and customs of international law, 
including the theory of restrictive immunity.345  This conclusion is 
illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s concern in Atkinson that international 
organizations be prevented from abusing their immunity when they engage 
in commercial agreements with private parties.346  Therefore, an obvious 
concern raised by the decision to transfer immunity determinations to the 
executive branch is that international organizations would be freed from the 
restrictions created either by the application of the FSIA or the 
corresponding benefit test. 
These concerns ignore the fact that the executive branch has already 
expressed its opinion on the proper level of immunity that should be 
extended to international organizations.347  The 1980 State Department 
letter written by Robert Owen contained a clear statement recommending 
that the same restrictive immunity conferred on foreign governments in the 
FSIA should be applied to international organizations.348  Given that the 
State Department has consistently maintained this position, it is almost 
certain that if the judiciary were to show deference to immunity 
determinations by the executive branch for international organizations, 
those organizations would continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts for their commercial activities.349 
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3.  The Proposal in Practice 
Reinterpreting the IOIA to establish judicial deference to executive 
branch determinations for the immunity of international organizations 
would not be difficult or disruptive.  As Hoffman illustrated, judicial 
deference does not require a recommendation by the President for each and 
every instance where immunity is asserted.350  Instead, the executive 
branch, or likely the State Department, would only need to issue an official 
determination when it wishes to depart from past policy; otherwise, courts 
can look to previous statements and precedent to determine whether an 
organization is in fact immune.351  Therefore, given the current statements 
issued by the State and Justice Departments, adopting this new 
interpretation for the IOIA would likely simplify litigation by establishing a 
single, clear rule that international organizations are generally entitled to 
only restrictive immunity.352 
At the same time, the new interpretation proposed by this Note would 
have the additional advantage of allowing the executive branch to play an 
active role in immunity determinations and to depart from a strict, 
restrictive immunity standard when necessary for U.S. security or 
interests.353  This ability touches upon the core difference between the 
immunity granted to foreign sovereigns and that extended to international 
organizations—unlike immunity requests by foreign governments, the 
United States has a direct investment in protecting international 
organizations.354  The United States is a member of every organization 
covered under the IOIA, and the immunity extended to these institutions 
has a direct effect upon the United States and its national interests in a way 
that the immunity of a foreign state never does.355  Therefore, adopting the 
interpretation of the IOIA proposed by this Note would allow the executive 
branch to actively monitor and protect both claims brought by its private 
citizens and its interests as a member of the organization involved. 
CONCLUSION 
When the 79th Congress established that the IOIA would extend “the 
same immunity . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments,”356 to 
international organizations, it was not referencing sovereign immunity as a 
specific body of law.357  Instead, the purpose of the IOIA was to impose the 
same judicial deference to the immunity determinations of the executive 
branch and State Department, which defined foreign sovereign immunity 
 
 350. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text; see also Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 31. 
 353. See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 356. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a (2006). 
 357. See supra notes 47–60, 85 and accompanying text. 
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after Ex parte Peru and Hoffman, on suits involving claims against 
international organizations.358 
Based on current statements and recommendations by the State 
Department, adopting this reinterpretation of the IOIA would simplify 
litigation by establishing that international organizations are only entitled to 
a baseline of restrictive immunity.359  However, this interpretation also 
offers an additional advantage, in that it would allow the executive branch, 
acting through the State Department, to easily monitor the IOIA’s 
application.  It would also allow the executive branch, when necessary to 
protect the interests of the United States, to adjust the immunity of 
international organizations either generally or for a specific suit.360 
 
 
 358. See supra notes 56–60, 85 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 181–83, 352 and accompanying text; see also Broadbent v. Org. of 
Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing an amicus brief submitted by the 
Justice Department). 
 360. See supra notes 1–5, 102–04, 353–55 and accompanying text. 
